Scoring rules for judgment aggregation by Dietrich, Franz
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
Franz Dietrich
CNRS (Paris, France), University of East Anglia (UK)
26 December 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/42431/
MPRA Paper No. 42431, posted 6 November 2012 17:17 UTC
Scoring rules for judgment aggregation
Franz Dietrich1
December 2011 (minor revisions later)
Abstract
This paper studies a class of judgment aggregation rules, to be called scoring rulesafter
their famous counterpart in preference aggregation theory. A scoring rule delivers the
collective judgments which reach the highest total scoreacross the individuals, subject
to the judgments having to be rational. Depending on how we dene scores, we obtain
several (old and new) solutions to the judgment aggregation problem, such as distance-
based aggregation, premise- and conclusion-based aggregation, truth-tracking rules, and a
generalization of Borda rule to judgment aggregation. Scoring rules are shown to generalize
the classical scoring rules of preference aggregation theory.
JEL Classication: D70, D71
Keywords: judgment aggregation, social choice, scoring rules, Kemeny rule, Borda rule,
distance-based aggregation
1 Introduction
The judgment aggregation problem consists in merging many individualsyes/no judgments
on some interconnected propositions into collective yes/no judgments on these propositions.
The classical example, born in legal theory, is that three jurors in a court trial disagree on
which of the following three propositions are true: the defendant has broken the contract
(p); the contract is legally valid (q); the defendant is liable (r). According to a univer-
sally accepted legal doctrine, r (the conclusion) is true if and only if p and q (the two
premises) are both true. So, r is logically equivalent to p ^ q. The simplest rule to ag-
gregate the jurors judgments namely propositionwise majority voting may generate
logically inconsistent collective judgments, as Table 1 illustrates. There are of course nu-
premise p premise q conclusion r (, p ^ q)
Individual 1 Yes Yes Yes
Individual 2 Yes No No
Individual 3 No Yes No
Majority Yes Yes No
Table 1: The classical example of logically inconsistent majority judgments
merous other possible agendas, i.e., kinds of interconnected propositions a group might
face. Preference aggregation is a special case with propositions of the form x is better than
1CNRS, Cerses, Paris, France & UEA, Norwich, U.K. Mail: post@franzdietrich.net. Web:
www.franzdietrich.net.
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y(for many alternatives x and y), where these propositions are interconnected through
standard conditions such as transitivity. In this context, Condorcets classical voting para-
dox about cyclical majority preferences is nothing but another example of inconsistent
majority judgments. Starting with List and Pettits (2002) seminal paper, a whole series
of contributions have explored which judgment aggregation rules can be used, depending
on, rstly, the agenda in question, and, secondly, the requirements placed on aggregation,
such as anonymity, and of course the consistency of collective judgments. Some theorems
generalize Arrows Theorem from preference to judgment aggregation (Dietrich and List
2007, Dokow and Holzman 2010; both build on Nehring and Puppe 2010a and strengthen
Wilson 1975). Other theorems have no immediate counterparts in classical social choice
theory (e.g., List 2004, Dietrich 2006a, 2010, Nehring and Puppe 2010b, Dietrich and
Mongin 2010).
It is fair to say that judgment aggregation theory has until recently been dominated
by impossibilityndings, as is evident from the Symposium on Judgment Aggregation
in Journal of Economic Theory (C. List and B. Polak eds., 2010, vol. 145(2)). The
recent conference Judgment aggregation and voting(Freudenstadt, 2011) however marks
a visible shift of attention towards constructing concrete aggregation rules and nding
second bestsolutions in the face of impossibility results. The new proposals range from
a rst Borda-type aggregation rule (Zwicker 2011) to, among others, new distance-based
rules (Duddy and Piggins 2011) and rules which approximate the majority judgments when
these are inconsistent (Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2011). The more traditional proposals
include premise- and conclusion-based rules (e.g., Kornhauser and Sager 1986, Pettit 2001,
List & Pettit 2002, Dietrich 2006, Dietrich and Mongin 2010), sequential rules (e.g., List
2004, Dietrich and List 2007b), distance-based rules (e.g., Konieszni and Pino-Perez 2002,
Pigozzi 2006, Miller and Osherson 2008, Eckert and Klamler 2009, Hartmann et al. 2010,
Lang et al. 2011), and quota rules with well-calibrated acceptance thresholds and various
degrees of collective rationality (e.g., Dietrich and List 2007b; see also Nehring and Puppe
2010a).
The present paper contributes to the theorys current constructivee¤ort by investi-
gating a class of aggregation rules to be called scoring rules. The inspiration comes from
classical scoring rules in preference aggregation theory. These rules generate collective pref-
erences which rank each alternative according to the sum-total scoreit receives from the
group members, where the scorecould be dened in di¤erent ways, leading to di¤erent
classical scoring rules such as Borda rule (see Smith 1973, Young 1975, Zwicker 1991, and
for abstract generalizations Myerson 1995, Zwicker 2008 and Pivato 2011b). In a general
judgment aggregation framework, however, there are no alternatives; so our scoring rules
are based on assigning scores to propositions, not alternatives. Nonetheless, our scoring
rules are related to classical scoring rules, and generalize them, as will be shown.
The paradigm underlying our scoring rules  i.e., the maximization of total score of
collective judgments di¤ers from standard paradigms in judgment aggregation, such as
the premise-, conclusion- or distance-based paradigms. Nonetheless, it will turn out that
several existing rules can be re-modelled as scoring rules, and can thus be rationalizedin
terms of the maximization of total scores. Of course, the way scores are being assigned
to propositions  the scoring di¤ers strongly across rules; for instance, the Kemeny
rule and the premise-based rule can each be viewed as a scoring rule, but with respect
to two very di¤erent scorings. This paper explores various plausible scorings. It uncovers
the scorings which implicitly underlie several well-known aggregation rules, and suggests
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other scorings which generate novel aggregation rules. For instance, a particularly natural
scoring, to be called reversal scoring, will lead to a new generalization of Borda rule from
preference aggregation to judgment aggregation. The problem of how to generalize Borda
rule has been a long-lasting open question in judgment aggregation theory. Recently, an
interesting (so far incomplete) proposal was made by William Zwicker (2011). Surprisingly,
his and the present Borda generalizations are distinctively di¤erent, as detailed below.2
Though large, the class of scoring rules is far from universal: some important aggrega-
tion rules fall outside this class (notably the mentioned rule approximating the majority
judgments, by Nehring, Pivato and Puppe 2011). I will also investigate a natural general-
ization of scoring rules, to be called set scoring rules, which are based on assigning scores
to entire judgment sets rather than single propositions (judgments). Set scoring rules are
for instance interesting in the context of epistemic (truth-tracking) aggregation models,
where they have recently been studied by Pivato (2011a).
After this introduction, Section 2 denes the general framework, Section 3 analyses
various scoring rules, Section 4 goes on to analyse several set scoring rules, and Section 5
draws some conclusions about where we stand in terms of concrete aggregation procedures.
2 The framework, examples and interpretations
I now introduce the framework, following List and Pettit (2002) and Dietrich (2007).3 We
consider a set of n ( 2) individuals, denoted N = f1; :::; ng. They need to decide which
of certain interconnected propositions to believeor accept.
The agenda. The set X of propositions under consideration is called the agenda. It
is subdivided into issues, i.e., pairs of a proposition and its negation, such as it will
rainand it wont rain. Rationally, an agent accepts exactly one proposition from each
issue (completeness), while respecting any logical interconnections between propositions
(consistency). We write :p for the negation of a proposition p, so that the agenda
takes the form X = fp;:p; q;:q; :::g, with issues fp;:pg, fq;:qg, etc. It is worth dening
the present notion of an agenda formally:
Denition 1 An agenda is a set X (containing the propositions) which is:
(a) partitioned into pairs fp; p0g (the issues, where the members p and p0 of an issue are
the negations of each other, written p  :p0 and p0  :p);
(b) endowed with logical interconnections, i.e., a notion of which subsets of X are con-
sistent, or formally, a system C  CX of subsets (the consistent sets).4
A simple example is the agenda given by
X = fp;:p; q;:q; p ^ q;:(p ^ q)g; (1)
where p and q are two atomic sentences, for instance it rainsand it is cold, and p ^ q
is their conjunction. Here, propositions are formulated as logical sentences. This is an
2 I know from him that also Conal Duddy and Ashley Piggins have independent work in progress about
generalizing Borda, and Klaus Nehring told me that he also had ideas similar to those in this paper.
3To be precise, I use a slimmer variant of their models, since the logic in which propositions are formed
is not explicitly part of the model.
4Algebraically, the agenda is thus the structure (X; I; C), where I is the partition into issues, or equiv-
alently, the structure (X;:; C), where : is the negation operator on X corresponding to I.
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example of the logical, or more precisely syntactic, approach of dening an agenda. This
approach is particularly natural, partly because the structure of the agenda  i.e., the
partition into issues and the interconnections  need not be specied explicitly as it is
directly inherited from logic. Logic for instance tells us that the set fp; p^ qg is consistent
while the set f:p; p ^ qg is not.
Given an agenda X, an individuals judgment set is the set J  X of propositions he
accepts. It is complete if it contains a member of each pair p;:p 2 X, and (fully) rational
if it is complete and consistent. The set of all rational judgment sets is denote by J .
Notationally, a judgment set J  X is often abbreviated by concatenating its members in
any order (so, p:q:r is short for fp;:q;:rg); and the negation-closure of a set Y  X is
denoted
Y   fp;:p : p 2 Y g.
We now introduce the two lead examples of this paper, the rst one being isomorphic to
the previous example (1).
Example 1: the doctrinal paradox agenda. This agenda is
X = fp; q; rg,
where p, q and r are atomic sentences and where the logical interconnections are dened
by classical logic relative to the external constraint r $ (p^ q). So, there are four rational
judgment sets:
J = fpqr; p:q:r;:pq:r;:p:q:rg:
Example 2: the preference agenda. For an arbitrary, nite set of alternatives A, the
preference agenda is dened as
X = XA = fxPy : x; y 2 A; x 6= yg;
where the negation of a proposition xPy is of course :xPy = yPx, and where logical
interconnections are dened by the usual conditions of transitivity, asymmetry and con-
nectedness, which dene a strict linear order. Formally, to each binary relation  over A
uniquely corresponds a judgment set, denoted J = fxPy 2 X : x  yg, and the set of all
rational judgment sets is
J = fJ :  is a strict linear order over Ag.
Henceforth let X be a given nite agenda faced by the group. As usual, we assume that
the agenda more precisely, its consistency notion is well-behaved. Well-behavedness or
regularitycan be expressed by three conditions (see Dietrich 2007):
C1: no set fp;:pg is consistent (self-entailment);
C2: subsets of consistent sets are consistent (monotonicity);
C3: ? is consistent and each consistent set can be extended to a complete and consistent
set (completability).
Equivalently, well-behavedness can be expressed by a single condition:
 C = fC  J : J 2 J g 6= ?, i.e., the consistent sets are precisely the subsets of fully
rational sets.
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The systems C of consistent and J of fully rational judgment sets are thus interdenable,
so that we could use J instead of C to concisely characterize the logical interconnections
of a well-behaved agenda.5
Aggregation rules. A (multi-valued) aggregation rule is a correspondence F which to
every prole of individual judgment sets (J1; :::; Jn) (from some domain, usually J n)
assigns a set F (J1; :::; Jn) of collectivejudgment sets. Typically, the output F (J1; :::; Jn)
is a singleton set fCg, in which case we identify this set with C and write F (J1; :::; Jn) = C.
If F (J1; :::; Jn) contains more than one judgment set, there is a tiebetween these judgment
sets. An aggregation rule is called single-valued or tie-free if it always generates a single
judgment set. A standard (single-valued) aggregation rule is majority rule; it is given by
F (J1; :::; Jn) = fp 2 X : p 2 Ji for more than half of the individuals ig
and generates inconsistent collective judgment sets for many agendas and proles. If both
individual and collective judgment sets are rational (i.e., in J ), the aggregation rule denes
a correspondence J n  J , and in the case of single-valuedness a function J n ! J .6
Approaches and interpretations. For interested readers, let me add some considera-
tions about the present model and its exibility. Firstly, I mention three salient ways of
specifying an agenda in practice. All three approaches could qualify broadly as logical:
 Under the syntactic approach mentioned above, the propositions are logical sentences,
i.e., X is a subset of the set L of sentences of some logic, where X is negation-closed.7
Such an agenda inherits its partition into issues (i.e., its negation operator) and its
interconnections (i.e., its consistency notion) from the logic. The logic is general: it
could for instance be standard propositional logic, standard predicate logic, or vari-
ous modal or conditional logics (see Dietrich 2007). Many real-life agendas draw on
non-standard logics by involving for instance modal operators or non-material condi-
tionals. Fortunately, most relevant logics are well-behaved, i.e., satisfy the conditions
C1-C3 (now read as conditions on sentences in L), so that the agenda is automatically
well-behaved.
 Under the semantic approach, the propositions are subsets of some set 
 of possi-
bilities or worlds, i.e., X  2
, where X is closed under taking complements in 

(negations). The issues are simply the pairs fp;
npg  X, and the consistent sets
are the sets S  X which are satisable, i.e., \p2Sp 6= ?. Notice that, just as in the
syntactic approach, the agendas structure (i.e., the issues and interconnections) is
inherited and thus need not be introduced explicitly.8
5So, algebraically speaking, a well-behaved agenda X could be dened as the structure (X; I;J ) instead
of (X; I; C) (where I is the partition of X into issues, replaceable by the negation operator : on X). To
see why C and J are indeed interdenable, note that if we start from a system J (any non-empty system
of sets containing exactly one member from each pair p;:p 2 X) then we can derive the system C as
[J2J fC : C  Jg (using that C must be well-behaved). A future challenge is to relax well-behavedness
by studying, e.g., judgment aggregation in non-monotonic logics.
6More generally, dropping the requirement of collective rationality, we have a correspondence J n  2X ,
where 2X is the set of all judgment sets, rational or not. As usual, I write instead of !to indicate
a multi -function.
7Negation-closure means that if X contains a sentence p then it also contains the sentence not p(or,
if p is already a negated sentence not q, the sentence q). Technically, we also exclude doube-negated
sentences not not p from the agenda. In summary, the agenda thus consists of pairs of an unnegated
sentence p and its negation not p. (Negation-closure of course implicitly assumes the negation symbol
notto belong to the logic, a minimal requirement of expressiveness.)
8Nehring and Puppes (2010a) property spaces are essentially semantically dened agendas.
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 Under an algebraic (or abstract semantic) approach, the agenda is a subset of an arbi-
trary Boolean algebra9 , where this subset is closed under taking (Boolean-algebraic)
complements. Here again the agenda directly inherits a structure of issues and inter-
connections.
Secondly, I mention an interpretational point (orthogonal to the formal question of
whether one works with a syntactic, semantic or abstract agenda). The standard interpre-
tation of judgment aggregation is of course an aggregation of judgments, i.e., belief-type
attitudes towards propositions. But one may re-interpret the nature of the attitude, so that
judgment sets become desire sets, or hope sets, or normative approval sets, or intention
sets, and so on; which leads to desire aggregation, or hope aggregation, and so on. In this
case we still aggregate propositional attitudes, albeit not judgments. In a more radical de-
parture, we may consider the aggregation of attributes other than propositional attitudes.
Here the agenda contains not propositions which one may or may not believe (or desire,
or hope etc.), but arbitrary attributes which one may or may not have. For instance, the
agenda might contain the attributes of liking piece, being successful, and so on, each of
which someone may or may not have. This leads to general attribute aggregation rather
than propositional attitude aggregation.10
3 Scoring rules
Scoring rules are particular judgment aggregation rules, dened on the basis of a so-called
scoring function. A scoring function or simply a scoring is a function s : X  J ! R
which to each proposition p and rational judgment set J assigns a number sJ(p), called the
score of p given J and measuring how p performs (scores) from the perspective of holding
judgment set J . As an elementary example, so-called simple scoring is given by:
sJ(p) =

1 if p 2 J
0 if p 62 J , (2)
so that all accepted propositions score 1, whereas all rejected propositions score 0. This
and many other scorings will be analysed. Let us think of the score of a set of propositions
as the sum of the scores of its members. So, the scoring s is extended to a function which
(given the agents judgment set J 2 J ) assigns to each set C  X the score
sJ(C) 
X
p2C
sJ(p).
A scoring s gives rise to an aggregation rule, called the scoring rule w.r.t. s and denoted
Fs. Given a prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n, this rule determines the collective judgments by
9A Boolean algebra is a lattice L (with its operations of join and meet) in which there exists a top element
| (tautology) and a bottom element ? (contradiction) and in which every element p has a complement
(i.e., an element whose join with p is | and whose meet with p is ?). An important example is a concrete
Boolean algebra L  2
 (for some underlying set of worlds
), in which the join is given by the union,
the meet by the intersection, the top by 
, the bottom by ?, and the complement by the standard set-
theoretic complement. In this case the algebraic approach reduces to the standard semantic approach.
Another example is the Boolean algebra generated from a logic by considering the set of sentences modulo
logical equivalence (where the logic includes classical negation and conjunction, which induce the algebras
join, meet and complement operations).
10Attribute aggregation raises the question of what it means for the collective to have an attribute.
Presumably, collective attributes are something quite di¤erent from individual attributes (just as collective
judgments di¤er in status from individual judgments).
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selecting the rational judgment set(s) with the highest sum-total score across all judgments
and all individuals:
Fs(J1; :::; Jn) = judgment set(s) in J with highest total score
= argmaxC2J
X
p2C;i2N
sJi(p) = argmaxC2J
X
i2N
sJi(C).
By a scoring rule simpliciter we of course mean an aggregation rule which is a scoring
rule w.r.t. some scoring. Di¤erent scorings s and s0 can generate the same scoring rule
Fs = Fs0 , in which case they are called equivalent. For instance, s is equivalent to s0 = 2s.11
3.1 Simple scoring and Kemeny rule
We rst consider the most elementary denition of scoring, namely simple scoring (2).
Table 2 illustrates the corresponding scoring rule Fs for the case of the agenda and prole
of our doctrinal paradox example. The entries in Table 2 are derived as follows. First, enter
Score of...
p :p q :q r :r pqr p:q:r :pq:r :p:q:r
Indiv. 1 (pqr) 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 0
Indiv. 2 (p:q:r) 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 1 2
Indiv. 3 (:pq:r) 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 3 2
Group 2 1 2 1 1 2 5* 5* 5* 4
Table 2: Simple scoring (2) for the doctrinal paradox agenda and prole
the score of each proposition (p;:p; q; :::) from each individual (1, 2 and 3). Second, enter
each individuals score of each judgment set by taking the row-wise sum. For instance,
individual 1s score of pqr is 1 + 1+ 1 = 3, and his score of p:q:r is 1 + 0+ 0 = 1. Third,
enter the groups score of each proposition by taking the column-wise sum. For instance,
the groups score of p is 1 + 1 + 0 = 2. Finally, enter the groups score of each judgment
set, by taking either a vertical or a horizontal sum (the two give the same result), and
add a star *in the eld(s) with maximal score to indicate the winning judgment set(s).
For instance, the groups score of pqr using a vertical sum is 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, and using a
horizontal sum it is 2+ 2+ 1 = 5. Since the judgment sets pqr, p:q:r and :pq:r all have
maximal group score, the scoring rule delivers a tie:
F (J1; J2; J3) = fpqr; p:q:r;:pq:rg:
This is a tie between the premise-based outcome pqr and the conclusion-based outcomes
p:q:r and :pq:r. Were we to add more individuals, the tie would presumably be broken
in one way or the other. In large groups, ties are a rare coincidence.
To link simple scoring to distance-based aggregation, suppose we measure the distance
between two rational judgment sets by using some distance function (metric) d over J .12
11More generally, certain increasing transformations have no e¤ect. As one may show, scorings s and s0
are equivalent (i.e., Fs = Fs0 ) whenever there are coe¢ cients a > 0 and bp 2 R (p 2 X) with bp = b:p for
all p 2 X such that s0 is given by s0J (p) = asJ (p) + bp.
12A distance function or metric over J is a function d : J  J ! [0;1) satisfying three conditions:
for all J;K;L 2 J , (i) d(J;K) = 0 , J = K, (ii) d(J;K) = d(K; J) (symmetry), and (iii) d(J; L) 
d(J;K) + d(K;L) (triangle inequality).
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The most common example is Kemeny distance d = dKemeny , dened as follows (where by
a judgment reversalI mean the replacement of an accepted proposition by its negation):
dKemeny(J;K) = number of judgment reversals needed to transform J into K
= jJnKj = jKnJ j = 1
2
jJ 4Kj .
For instance, the Kemeny-distance between pqr and p:q:r (for our doctrinal paradox
agenda) is 2.
Now the distance-based rule w.r.t. distance d is the aggregation rule Fd which for
any prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n determines the collective judgment set(s) by minimizing the
sum-total distance to the individual judgment sets:
Fd(J1; :::; Jn) = judgment set(s) in J with minimal sum-distance to the prole
= argminC2J
X
i2N
d(C; Ji).
The most popular example, Kemeny rule FdK em eny , can be characterized as a scoring rule:
Proposition 1 The simple scoring rule is the Kemeny rule.
3.2 Classical scoring rules for preference aggregation
I now show that our scoring rules generalize the classical scoring rules of preference ag-
gregation theory. Consider the preference agenda X for a given set of alternatives A of
nite size k. Classical scoring rules (such as Borda rule) are dened by assigning scores
to alternatives in A, not to propositions xPy in X. Given a strict linear order  over A,
each alternative x 2 A is assigned a score SCO(x) 2 R. The most popular example is of
course Borda scoring, for which the highest ranked alternative in A scores k, the second-
highest k   1, the third-highest k   2, ..., and the lowest 1. Given a prole (1; :::;n)
of individual preferences (strict linear orders), the collective ranks the alternatives x 2 X
according to their sum-total score
P
i2N SCOi(x). To translate this into the judgment
aggregation formalism, recall that each strict linear order  over A uniquely corresponds
to a rational judgment set J 2 J (given by xPy 2 J , x  y); we may therefore write
SCOJ(x) instead of SCO(x), and view the classical scoring SCO as a function of (x; J)
in AJ . Formally, I dene a classical scoring as an arbitrary function SCO : AJ ! R,
and the classical scoring rule w.r.t. it as the judgment aggregation rule F  FSCO for the
preference agenda which for every prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n returns the rational judgment
set(s) that rank an alternative x over another y whenever x has a higher sum-total score
than y:13
F (J1; :::; Jn) = fC 2 J : C contains all xPy 2 X s.t.
X
i2N
SCOJi(x) >
X
i2N
SCOJi(y)g:
13A technical di¤erence between the standard notion of a scoring rule in preference aggregation theory
and our judgment-theoretic rendition of it arises when there happen to exist distinct alternatives with
identical sum-total score. In such cases, the standard scoring rule returns collective indi¤ erences, whereas
our FSCO returns a tie between strict preferences. From a formal perspective, however, the two denitions
are equivalent, since to any weak order corresponds the set (tie) of all strict linear orders which linearize
the weak order by breaking its indi¤erences (in any cycle-free way). The structural asymmetry between
input and output preferences of scoring rules as dened standardly (i.e., the possibility of indi¤erences at
the collective level) may have been one of the obstacles  albeit only a small, mainly psychological one 
for importing scoring rules and Borda aggregation into judgment aggregation theory.
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Now, any given classical scoring SCO induces a scoring s in our (proposition-based) sense.
In fact, there are two canonical (and, as we will see, equivalent) ways to dene s: one might
dene s either by
sJ(xPy) = SCOJ(x)  SCOJ(y); (3)
or, if one would like the lowest achievable score to be zero, by
sJ(xPy) = maxfSCOJ(x)  SCOJ(y); 0g =

SCOJ(x)  SCOJ(y) if xPy 2 J
0 if xPy 62 J (4)
(where the last equality assumes that SCOJ(x) > SCOJ(y) , xPy 2 J for all x, y
and J , a property that is so natural that we might have built it into the denition of a
classical scoringSCO). This allows us to characterize classical scoring rules in terms of
proposition-based rather than alternative-based scoring:
Proposition 2 In the case of the preference agenda (for any nite set of alternatives),
every classical scoring rule is a scoring rule, namely one with respect to a scoring s derived
from the classical scoring SCO via (3) or via (4).
3.3 Reversal scoring and a Borda rule for judgment aggregation
Given the agents judgment set J , let us think of the score of a proposition p 2 X as a
measure of how distantthe negation :p is from J ; so, p scores high if :p is far from J , and
low if :p is contained in J . More precisely, let the score of a proposition p given J 2 J be
the number of judgment reversals needed to reject p, i.e., the number of propositions in J
that must (minimally) be negated in order to obtain a consistent judgment set containing
:p. So, denoting the judgment set arising from J by negating the propositions in a subset
R  J by J:R = (JnR) [ f:r : r 2 Rg, so-called reversal scoring is dened by
sJ(p) = number of judgment reversals needed to reject p (5)
= min
RJ:J:R2J&p62J:R
jRj = min
J02J :p62J0
jJnJ 0j = min
J02J :p62J0
dKemeny(J; J
0).
For instance, a rejected proposition p 62 J scores zero, since J itself contains :p so that
it su¢ ces to negate zero propositions (R = ?). An accepted proposition p 2 J scores
1 if J remains consistent by negating p (R = fpg), and scores more than 1 otherwise
(R ) fpg). Table 3 illustrates reversal scoring for our doctrinal paradox example. For
instance, individual 1s judgment set pqr leads to a score of 2 for proposition p, since in
order for him to reject p he needs to negate not just p (as :pqr is inconsistent), but also
r (where :pq:r is consistent). The scoring rule delivers a tie between the judgment sets
Score of...
p :p q :q r :r pqr p:q:r :pq:r :p:q:r
Indiv. 1 (pqr) 2 0 2 0 2 0 6 2 2 0
Indiv. 2 (p:q:r) 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 5 2 4
Indiv. 3 (:pq:r) 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 5 4
Group 3 2 3 2 2 4 8 9* 9* 8
Table 3: Reversal scoring (5) for the doctrinal paradox agenda and prole
p:q:r and :pq:r. This is a tie between two conclusion-based outcomes; the premise-based
outcome pqr is rejected (unlike for simple scoring in Section 3.1).
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The remarkable feature of reversal scoring rule is that it generalizes Borda rule from
preference to judgment aggregation. Borda rule is initially only dened for the preference
agenda X (for a given nite set of alternatives), namely as the classical scoring rule w.r.t.
Borda scoring; see the last subsection. The key observation is that reversal scoring is
intimately linked to Borda scoring:
Remark 1 In the case of the preference agenda (for any nite set of alternatives), reversal
scoring s is given by (4) with SCO dened as classical Borda scoring.
Let me sketch the simple argument it should sound familiar to social choice theorists.
Let s be reversal scoring, X the preference agenda for a set of alternatives A of size k <1,
and SCO classical Borda scoring. Consider any xPy 2 X and J 2 J . If xPy 2 XnJ , then
:xPy = yPx 2 J , which implies sJ(xPy) = 0, as required by (4). Now suppose xPy 2 J .
Clearly, SCOJ(x) > SCOJ(y). Consider the alternatives in the order  established by J :
xk  xk 1      x      y      x1,
where xj is the alternative with SCOJ(xj) = j. Step by step, we now move y up in the
ranking, where each step consists in raising the position (score) of y by one. Each step
corresponds to negating one proposition in J , namely the proposition zPy where z is the
alternative that is currently being overtakenby y. After exactly SCOJ(x)   SCOJ(y)
steps, y has overtakenx, i.e., xPy has been negated. So, sJ(xPy) is at most SCOJ(x) 
SCOJ(y). It is exactly SCOJ(x)   SCOJ(y), since, as the reader may check, no smaller
number of judgment reversals allows y to overtakex in the ranking.
Remark 1 and Proposition 2 imply that reversal scoring allows us to extend Borda rule
to arbitrary judgment aggregation problems:
Proposition 3 The reversal scoring rule generalizes Borda rule, i.e., matches it in the
case of the preference agenda (for any nite set of alternatives).
I note that one could use a perfectly equivalent variant of reversal scoring s which, in
the case of the preference agenda, is related to classical Borda scoring SCO via (3) instead
of (4):
Remark 2 Reversal scoring s is equivalent (in terms of the resulting scoring rule) to the
scoring s0 given by
s0J(p) = sJ(p)  sJ(:p) =

sJ(p) if p 2 J
 sJ(:p) if p 62 J ,
and in the case of the preference agenda (for any nite set of alternatives) this scoring is
given by
s0J(xPy) = SCOJ(x)  SCOJ(y)
with SCO dened as classical Borda scoring.
For comparison, I now sketch Zwickers (2011) interesting approach to extending Borda
rule to judgment aggregation let me call such an extension a Borda-Zwickerrule. The
motivation derives from a geometric characterization of Borda preference aggregation ob-
tained by Zwicker (1991). Let me write the agenda as X = fp1;:p1; p2;:p2; :::; pm;:pmg,
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where m is the number of issues. Each prole gives rise to a vector v  (v1; :::; vm) in Rm
whose jth entry vj is the net support for pj , i.e., the number of individuals accepting pj mi-
nus the same number for :pj . Now ifX is the preference agenda for any nite set of alterna-
tives A, then each pj takes the form xPy for certain alternatives x; y 2 A. Each preference
cycle can be mapped to a vector in Rm; for instance, if p1 = xPy, p2 = yPz and p3 = xPz,
then the cycle x  y  z  x becomes the vector (1; 1; 1; 0; :::; 0) 2 Rm. The linear
span of all vectors corresponding to preference cycles denes the so-called cycle space
Vcycle  Rm, and its orthogonal complement denes the cocycle spaceVcocycle  Rm.
Let vcocycle be the orthogonal projection of v on the cocycle space Vcocycle. Intuitively,
vcocycle contains the consistentor acyclicpart of v. The upshot is that the Borda out-
come can be read o¤ from vcocyle: for each pj = xPy, the Borda group preference ranks x
above (below) y if the jth entry of vcocyle is positive (negative). Zwickers strategy for ex-
tending Borda rule to judgment aggregation is to dene a subspace Vcycle analogously for
agendas other than the preference agenda; one can then again project v on the orthogonal
complement of Vcycle and determine collective Bordajudgments according to the signs of
the entries of this projection. This approach has proved successful for simple agendas, in
which there is a natural way to dene Vcycle. Whether the approach is viable for general
agendas (i.e., whether Vcycle has a useful general denition) seems to be open so far.14
A Borda-Zwicker rule is not just constructed di¤erently from a scoring rule in our sense,
but, as I conjecture, it also cannot generally be remodelled as a scoring rule, since most
interesting scoring rules use information that goes beyond the information contained in
the proles net support vectorv 2 Rm. (Even more does the required information go
beyond the projection of v on the orthogonal complement of Vcycle.)
In summary, there seem to exist two quite di¤erent approaches to generalizing Borda
aggregation. One approach, taken by Zwicker, seeks to lter out the proles inconsistent
componentalong the lines of the just-described geometric technique. The other approach,
taken here, seeks to retain the principle of score-maximization inherent in Borda aggrega-
tion (with scoring now dened at the level of propositions, not alternatives, as these do
not exist outside the world of preferences). The normative core of the scoring approach is
to use information about someones strength of accepting a proposition (as measured by
the score), just as Borda preference aggregation uses information about someones strength
of preferring one alternative x over another y (as measured by the score of xPy, i.e., the
di¤erence between xs and ys score). Whether strength or intensity of preference is a
permissible or even meaningful concept is a notoriously controversial question; the purely
ordinalist approach takes a sceptical stance here. This is where Borda preference aggrega-
tion di¤ers from Condorcets rule of pairwise majority voting, which uses only the (ordinal)
information of whether someone prefers an alternative over another, without attempting
to extract strength-of-preference information from that persons full preference relation.
3.4 A generalization of reversal scoring
Recall that the reversal score of a proposition p can be characterized as the distance by
which one must deviate from the current judgment set in order to reject p where distance
is understood as Kemeny-distance. It is natural to also consider other kinds of a distance.
14One might at rst be tempted to generally dene Vcycle as the linear span of those vectors which
correspond to the agendas minimal inconsistent subsets. Unfortunately, this span is often the entire space
Rm, an example for this being our doctrinal paradox agenda.
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Relative to any given distance function d over J , one may dene a corresponding scoring
by
sJ(p) = distance by which one must depart from J to reject p (6)
= min
J02J :p62J0
d(J; J 0).
This provides us with a whole class of scoring rules, all of which are variants of our
judgment-theoretic Borda rule. In the special case of the preference agenda, we thus
obtain new variants of classical Borda rule.
Interestingly, if we adopt Duddy and Piggins(2011) distance function, i.e., if d(J; J 0)
is the number of minimal consistent modications needed to transform J into J 0,15 then
scoring (6) reduces to simple scoring (2), and so the scoring rule reduces to the Kemeny rule
by Proposition 1. So, ironically, while Duddy and Piggins had introduced their distance
in the di¤erent context of distance-based aggregation to develop an alternative to Kemeny
rule, when we use their distance (instead of Kemenys) in our context of scoring rules we
are led back to Kemeny rule.
3.5 Scoring based on logical entrenchment
We now consider scoring rules which explicitly exploit the logical structure of the agenda.
Let us think of the score of a proposition p (2 X) given the judgment set J (2 J ) as the
degree to which p is logically entrenched in the belief system J , i.e., as the strengthwith
which J entails p. We measure this strength by the number of ways in which p is entailed
by J , where each wayis given by a particular judgment subset S  J which entails p,
i.e., for which S [ f:pg is inconsistent. If J does not contain p, then no judgment subset
not even the full set J can entail p; so the strength of entailment (score) of p is zero.
If J contains p, then p is entailed by the judgment subset fpg, and perhaps also by very
di¤erent judgment subsets; so the strength of entailment (score) of p is positive and more
or less high.
There are di¤erent ways to formalise this idea, depending on precisely which of the
judgment subsets that entail p are deemed relevant. I now propose four formalizations.
Two of them will once again allow us to generalize Borda rule from preference to judgment
aggregation. These generalizations di¤er from that based on reversal scoring in Section
3.3.
Our rst, naive approach is to count each judgment subset which entails p as a separate,
full-edged wayin which p is entailed. This leads to so-called entailment scoring, dened
by:
sJ(p) = number of judgment subsets which entail p (7)
= jfS  J : S entails pgj .
If p 62 J then sJ(p) = 0, while if p 2 J then sJ(p)  2jXj=2 1 since p is entailed by at least
all sets S  J which contain p, i.e., by at least 2jJj 1 = 2jXj=2 1 sets. One might object
15Judgment sets J; J 0 2 J are minimal consistent modications of each other if the set S = JnJ 0 of
propositions in J which need to be negated to transform J into J 0 is non-empty and minimal (i.e., J
couldnt have been transformed into a consistent set by negating only a strict non-empty subset of S). For
our doctrinal paradox agenda, the judgment sets pqr and p:q:r are minimal consistent modications of
each other, and hence have Duddy-Piggins-distance of 1.
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that this denition of scoring involves redundancies, i.e., multiple counting. Suppose for
instance p belongs to J and is logically independent of all other propositions in J . Then p
is entailed by several subsets S of J all S  J which contain p and yet these entailments
are essentially identical since all premises in S other than p are irrelevant.
I now present three renements of scoring (7), each of which responds di¤erently to the
mentioned redundancy objection. In the rst renement, we count two entailments of p
as di¤erent only if they have no premise in common. This leads to what I call disjoint-
entailment scoring, formally dened by:
sJ(p) = number of mutually disjoint judgment subsets entailing p (8)
= maxfm : J has m mutually disjoint subsets each entailing pg.
In the mentioned case where p (2 J) is logically independent of all other propositions in
J , we now avoid multiple counting: sJ(p) is only 1, as one cannot nd di¤erent mutually
disjoint judgment subsets entailing p. For our doctrinal paradox agenda and prole, the
scoring rule delivers a tie between the two conclusion-based outcomes p:q:r and :pq:r,
Score of...
p :p q :q r :r pqr p:q:r :pq:r :p:q:r
Indiv. 1 (pqr) 2 0 2 0 2 0 6 2 2 0
Indiv. 2 (p:q:r) 1 0 0 2 0 2 1 5 2 4
Indiv. 3 (:pq:r) 0 2 1 0 0 2 1 2 5 4
Group 3 2 3 2 2 4 8 9* 9* 8
Table 4: Disjoint-entailment scoring (8) for the doctrinal paradox agenda and prole
as illustrated in Table 4. For instance, individual 2 has judgment set p:q:r, so that p
scores 1 (it is entailed by fpg but by no other disjoint judgment subset), :q scores 2 (it
is disjointly entailed by f:qg and fp;:rg), :r scores 2 (it is disjointly entailed by f:rg
and f:qg), and all rejected propositions score zero (they are not entailed by any judgment
subsets).
Disjoint-entailment scoring turns out to match reversal scoring for our doctrinal paradox
agenda (check that Tables 3 and 4 coincide), as well as for the preference agenda (as shown
later). Is this pure coincidence? The general relationship is that the disjoint-entailment
score of a proposition p is always at most the reversal score, as one may show.16
While this renement of naive entailment scoring (7) avoids multiple countingby only
counting entailments with mutually disjoint sets of premises, the next two renements use
a di¤erent strategy to avoid multiple counting. The new strategy is to count only those
entailments whose sets of premises are minimal with minimality understood either in the
sense that no premises can be removed, or in the sense that no premises can be logically
weakened. To begin with the rst sense of minimality, I say that a set minimally entails
p (2 X) if it entails p but no strict subset of it entails p, and I dene minimal-entailment
scoring by
sJ(p) = number of judgment subsets which minimally entail p (9)
= jfS  J : S minimally entails pgj .
16The reason is that, given m mutually disjoint judgment subsets which each entail p, the reversal score
of p is at least m since one must negate at least one proposition from each of these m sets in order to
consistently reject p.
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If for instance p is contained in J , then fpg minimally entails p,17 but strict supersets of
fpg do not and are therefore not counted. For our doctrinal paradox agenda, this scoring
happens to coincide with reversal scoring and disjoint-entailment scoring. Indeed, Table 3
resp. 4 still applies; e.g., for individual 2 with judgment set p:q:r, p still scores 1 (it is
minimally entailed only by fpg), :q still scores 2 (it is minimally entailed by f:qg and by
fp;:rg), :r still scores 2 (it is minimally entailed by f:rg and by f:qg), and all rejected
propositions still score zero (they are not minimally entailed by any judgment subsets).
Scoring (9) is certainly appealing. Nonetheless, one might complain that it still al-
lows for certain redundancies, albeit of a di¤erent kind. Consider the preference agenda
with set of alternatives A = fx; y; z; wg, and the judgment set J = fxPy; yPz; zPw;
xPz; yPw; xPwg (2 J ). The proposition xPw is minimally entailed by the subset
S = fxPy; yPz; zPwg. While this entailment is minimal in the (set-theoretic) sense that
we cannot remove premises, it is non-minimal in the (logical) sense that we can weaken
some of its premises: if we replace xPy and yPz in S by their logical implication xPz,
then we obtain a weaker set of premises S0 = fxPz; zPwg which still entails xPw. We
shall say that S fails to irreducibly entail xPw, in spite of minimally entailing it. In
general, a set of propositions is called weaker than another one (which is called stronger)
if the second set entails each member of the rst set, but not vice versa. A set S ( X)
is dened to irreducibly (or logically minimally) entail p if S entails p, and moreover there
is no subset Y ( S which can be weakened (i.e., for which there is a weaker set Y 0  X
such that (SnY ) [ Y 0 still entails p). Each irreducible entailment is a minimal entailment,
as is seen by taking Y 0 = ?.18 In the previous example, the set fxPy; yPz; zPwg mini-
mally, but not irreducibly entails xPw, and the set fxPz; zPwg irreducibly entails xPw.
Irreducible-entailment scoring is naturally dened by
sJ(p) = number of judgment subsets which irreducibly entail p (10)
= jfS  J : S irreducibly entails pgj .
This scoring matches reversal scoring and both previous scorings in the case of our doc-
trinal paradox example: Table 3 resp. 4 still applies. But for many other agendas these
scorings all deviate from one another, resulting in di¤erent collective judgments. As for
the preference agenda, we have already announced the following result:
Proposition 4 Disjoint-entailment scoring (8) and irreducible-entailment scoring (10)
match reversal scoring (5) in the case of the preference agenda (for any nite set of alter-
natives).
Propositions 3 and 4 jointly have an immediate corollary.
Corollary 1 The scoring rules w.r.t. scorings (8) and (10) both generalize Borda rule,
i.e., match it in the case of the preference agenda (for any nite set of alternatives).
3.6 Propositionwise scoring and a way to repair quota rules with
non-rational outputs
We now consider a special class of scorings: propositionwise scorings. This will allow us to
relate scoring rules to the well-known judgment aggregation rules called quota rules in
17Assuming that p is not a tautology, i.e., that f:pg is consistent. (Otherwise, ? minimally entails p.)
18Assuming X contains no tautology, i.e., no p such that f:pg is inconsistent.
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fact, to repairthese rules by rendering their outcomes rational across all proles.
I call scoring s propositionwise if the score of a proposition p 2 X only depends on
whether p is accepted, i.e., if sJ(p) = sK(p) whenever J and K (in J ) both contain p or
both do not contain p. Equivalently, scoring is propositionwise just in case for each p 2 X
there is a pair of real numbers s+(p); s (p) such that
sJ(p) =

s+(p) for all J 2 J containing p
s (p) for all J 2 J not containing p. (11)
Intuitively, s+(p) is the score of an accepted proposition p, and s (p) is the score of a
rejected proposition p. Typically, of course, s+(p) > s (p). An example is simple scoring:
there, s+(p) = 1 and s (p) = 0.
How do propositionwise scoring rules behave? They derive a proposition ps sum-total
score locally, i.e., based only on peoples judgments about p. This property stands in
obvious analogy to a well-studied axiom on aggregation rules, namely the axiom of propo-
sitionwise or independent aggregation, which prescribes that the collective judgment about
any given proposition p is derived locally, i.e., again based only on peoples judgments
about p. Can we therefore relate propositionwise scoring to independent aggregation?
The paradigmatic independent aggregation rules are the quota rules.19 A quota rule is a
(single-valued) aggregation rule which is given by an acceptance threshold mp 2 f1; :::; ng
for each proposition p 2 X. The quota rule corresponding to the so-called threshold family
(mp)p2X is denoted F(mp)p2X and accepts those propositions p which are supported by at
least mp individuals: for each prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n,
F(mp)p2X (J1; :::; Jn) = fp 2 X : jfi : p 2 Jigj  mpg.
Special cases are unanimity rule (given by mp = n for all p), majority rule (given by
the majority threshold mp = d(n+ 1)=2e for all p), and more generally, uniform quota
rules (given by a uniform threshold mp  m for all p). A uniform quota rules is also
referred to as a supermajority rule if m exceeds the majority threshold, and a submajority
rule if m is below the majority threshold. Note that supermajority rules may generate
incomplete collective judgment sets, while submajority rule may accept both members of
a pair p;:p 2 X, a drastic form of inconsistency. If one wishes that exactly one member
of each pair p;:p 2 X is accepted, the thresholds of p and :p should be complementsof
each other: mp = n+ 1 m:p.
A non-trivial question is how the acceptance thresholds would have to be set to ensure
that the collective judgment set satises some given degree of rationality, such as to be (i)
consistent, or (ii) deductively closed, or (iii) consistent and deductively closed, or even (iv)
fully rational, i.e., in J . These questions have been settled (see Nehring and Puppe 2010a
for (iv), and, subsequently, Dietrich and List 2007b for (i)-(iv)). Unfortunately, for many
agendas the thresholds would have to be set at extreme and normatively unattractive
levels. Worse, often no thresholds achieve (iv) (see Nehring and Puppe 2010a). For our
doctrinal paradox agenda X = fp; q; rg only the extreme thresholds mp = mq = mr = n
and m:p = m:q = m:r = 1 achieve (iv), and for the preference agenda (with more than
two alternatives) no thresholds achieve (iv).
Given that quota rules with reasonablethresholds typically violate many of the condi-
tions (i)-(iv), one may want to depart from ordinary quota rules by modifying (repairing)
19They are the only independent rules which are anonymous, monotonic and unanimity-preserving.
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them so that they always generate rational outputs. This can be done by using proposi-
tionwise scoring rules. Given an arbitrary quota rule with threshold family (mp)p2X , one
can specify a propositionwise scoring such that the scoring rule replicates the quota rule
whenever the quota rule generates a rational output, while repairingthe output other-
wise. How must we calibrate s+(p) and s (p) in order to achieve this? The idea is that
individuals who accept p should contribute a positive score s+(p) > 0, while those who
reject p should contribute a negative score s (p) < 0. The absolute sizes of s+(p) and
s (p) should be calibrated such that the sum-total score of p becomes positive (helping
the scoring rule to accept p) exactly when the quota rule accepts p, i.e., when at least mp
individuals accept p. Specically, we set:
sJ(p) =

s+(p) = n+ 1 mp for all J 2 J containing p
s (p) =  mp for all J 2 J not containing p. (12)
Intuitively, the higher the acceptance threshold mp is, the smaller the positive contribution
s+(p) is and the larger the negative contribution s (p) is (in absolute value); hence, the
more individuals accepting p are needed for ps sum-total score to get positive, and the
harder it becomes for the scoring rule to accept p. This scoring does the intended job:
Proposition 5 For every threshold family (mp)p2X , the scoring rule w.r.t. scoring (12)
matches the quota rule F(mp)p2X at all proles where the quota rule generates rational
outputs (and still generates rational outputs at all other proles).
As an example, consider our doctrinal paradox agenda X = fp; q; rg with n = 3
individuals, and suppose the quota rule departs only slightly from propositionwise majority
voting: all propositions t in Xnf:rg keep a majority threshold of mt = 2, but :r receives
a unanimity threshold m:r = 3. This quota rule manages to never generate logically
inconsistent collective judgment sets,20 but does so at the expense of allowing collective
incompleteness. Indeed, for our example prole, the quota rule returns the collective
judgment set pq, which is silent on the choice between r nor :r. As illustrated in Table 5,
the scoring rule w.r.t. (12) restores collective rationality by leading to the premise-based
Score of...
p :p q :q r :r pqr p:q:r :pq:r :p:q:r
Indiv. 1 (pqr) 2 -2 2 -2 2 -3 6 -3 -3 -7
Indiv. 2 (p:q:r) 2 -2 -2 2 -2 1 -2 5 -3 1
Indiv. 3 (:pq:r) -2 2 2 -2 -2 1 -2 -3 5 1
Group 2 -2 2 -2 -2 -1 2* -1 -1 -5
Table 5: Scoring (12) for the doctrinal paradox agenda and prole
outcome pqr. To read the table, note that scoring (12) is given by s+(t) = 2 and s (t) =  2
for all t in Xnf:rg, s+(:r) = 1 and s (:r) =  3.
How does our scoring rule repairthose special quota rules which use a uniform thresh-
old m  mp (p 2 X), such as majority rule?
20This follows from Nehring and Puppes (2010) intersection property, generalized to possibly incomplete
collective judgment sets (Dietrich and List 2007b).
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Remark 3 For a uniform threshold m  mp, the scoring rule w.r.t. scoring (12) is the
Kemeny rule, or equivalently, the simple scoring rule.
This remark follows from Proposition 1 and the fact that, for a uniform threshold
m  mp, scoring (12) is equivalent to simple scoring by footnote 11.
Finally, I note that the scoring rules w.r.t. (12) is not the only scoring rule which can
repairthe quota rule F(mp)p2X though it might be the most plausible one, as long as we
do not wish to introduce additional parameters. If, however, we are prepared to introduce
additional parameters, scoring (12) can be generalized: for each p 2 X let p > 0 be a
coe¢ cient measuring how important it is that the scoring rule is faithful to the quota rules
collective judgment on p; and let scoring be dened by
sJ(p) =

s+(p) = p(n+ 1 mp) if p 2 J
s (p) =  pmp if p 62 J . (13)
The earlier scoring (12) is obviously a special case in which all p are 1. Proposition
5 still holds for this generalized kind of propositionwise scoring. The scoring rule will
tend to match the quota rule on propositions p with high importance coe¢ cient p, while
modifying (repairing) the quota rule at propositions p with low p.
3.7 Premise- and conclusion-based aggregation
I have just mentioned the possibility of a di¤erential treatment of propositions when re-
pairing a quota rule. This possibility is particularly salient in the popular context of
premise- or conclusion-based aggregation.21 One may indeed view the classical premise-
and conclusion-based rules as two (rival) ways of repairing the simplest of all quota rules 
majority rule by privileging certain propositions over others, namely premise propositions
or conclusion propositions, respectively.
Let me put this precisely. Consider majority voting, i.e., the quota rule with a uniform
majority threshold m  mp (the smallest integer above n=2). To restore collective ratio-
nality, we again endow each proposition p 2 X with a coe¢ cient of importance, but now
let this coe¢ cient be determined by whether p has a premiseor conclusionstatus. For-
mally, suppose the agenda is partitioned into two negation-closed sets, the set P of premise
propositionsand the set XnP of conclusion propositions. In the case of our doctrinal
paradox agenda X = fp; q; rg, we have P = fp; qg. Each premise proposition p 2 P has
the importance coe¢ cient p  premise, and each conclusion proposition p 2 XnP has
the importance coe¢ cient p  conclusion, for xed parameters premise; conclusion  0.
In this scenario, the scoring (13) becomes equivalent (by footnote 11) to the scoring given
by
sJ(p) =
8<:
premise for accepted premise propositions p 2 J \ P
conclusion for accepted conclusion propositions p 2 JnP
0 for rejected propositions p 62 J .
(14)
By calibrating the two importance coe¢ cients, we can inuence the relative weights of
premises and conclusions. If we give far more importance to premise propositions (premise 
conclusion) or to conclusion propositions (conclusion  premise), the scoring rule reduces
to the premise- or conclusion-based rule, respectively. To substantiate this claim, one needs
21See for instance List (2004), Dietrich and Mongin (2010) and Nehring and Puppe (2010b).
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to dene both rules. For simplicity, I restrict attention to our doctrinal paradox agenda
X = fp; q; rg with P = fp; qg (though more general X and P could be considered22).
In this case, assuming for simplicity that the group size n is odd,
 the premise-based rule is the aggregation rule which for each prole in J n delivers
the (unique) judgment set in J containing each premise proposition accepted by a
majority;
 the conclusion-based rule is the aggregation rule which for each prole in J n delivers
the judgment set (or sets) in J containing the conclusion proposition accepted by a
majority.23
These two rules have the following characterizations as scoring rules:
Remark 4 For our doctrinal paradox agenda X = fp; q; rg with set of premise proposi-
tions P = fp; qg, and for an odd group size, the scoring rule w.r.t. scoring (14) is
 the premise-based rule if and only if premise > (n  2)conclusion,
 the conclusion-based rule if and only if conclusion > premise = 0.
This result lets premise- and conclusion-based aggregation appear in a rather ex-
treme light: each rule is based on somewhat unequal importance coe¢ cients premise and
conclusion, deeming one type of proposition to be overwhelmingly more important than
the other. It might therefore be interesting to consider more equilibrated values of the
importance coe¢ cients, so as to achieve a compromise between democracy at the premise
level and democracy at the conclusion level.
4 Set scoring rules: assigning scores to entire judgment
sets
An interesting generalization of scoring rules is obtained by assigning scores directly to
entire judgment sets rather than single propositions. A set scoring function or simply set
scoring is a function  which to every pair of rational judgment sets C and J assigns a
real number J(C), the score of C given J , which measures how well C performs (scores)
from the perspective of holding the judgment set J . Formally,  : J  J ! R. The most
elementary example, to be called naive set scoring, is given by
J(C) =

1 if C = J
0 if C 6= J . (15)
Any set scoring  gives rise to an aggregation rule F, the set scoring rule (or general-
ized scoring rule) w.r.t. , which for each prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n selects the collective
judgment set(s) C in J having maximal sum-total score across individuals:
F(J1; :::; Jn) = argmaxC2J
X
i2N
Ji(C).
22Our analysis generalizes easily to any X and P such that (i) the premise propositions in P are logically
independent, and (ii) complete judgments across the premise propositions in P uniquely determine the
judgments on the conclusion propositions in XnP .
23 In the literature, the conclusion-based procedure is usually taken to be silent on the premises, i.e., to
return an incomplete judgment set not in J . I have replaced this silence by a tie between all compatible
judgments on the premise propositions.
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An aggregation rule is a set scoring rule simpliciter if it is the set scoring rule w.r.t. to
some set scoring . Set scoring rules generalize ordinary scoring rules, since to any ordinary
scoring s corresponds a set scoring , given by
J(C) 
X
p2C
sJ(p),
and the ordinary scoring rule w.r.t. s coincides with the set scoring rule w.r.t. .
4.1 Naive set scoring and plurality voting
Plurality rule is the aggregation rule F which for every prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n declares
the most often submitted judgment set(s) as the collective judgment set(s):
F (J1; :::; Jn) = most frequently submitted judgment set(s)
= argmaxC2J jfi : Ji = Cgj .
This rule is of course normatively questionable;24 but it deserves our attention, if only
because of its simplicity and the recognized importance of plurality voting in social choice
theory more broadly. Plurality rule can be construed as a set scoring rule:
Remark 5 The naive set scoring rule is plurality rule.
4.2 Distance-based set scoring
Set scoring rules generalize distance-based aggregation. Given an arbitrary distance func-
tion d over J (not necessarily the Kemeny-distance), all that is needed is to consider what
I call distance-based set scoring, dened by
J(C) =  d(C; J). (16)
So, C scores high if it is close to the judgment set held, J . This renders sum-score-
maximization equivalent to sum-distance-minimization:
Remark 6 For every given distance function over J , the distance-based set scoring rule
is the distance-based rule.
So, all distance-based rules can be modelled as set scoring rules (but not vice versa25).
As an example, consider the so-called discrete distance,26 dened by
d(J;K) =

0 if J = K
1 if J 6= K.
Here, distance-based set scoring (16) is equivalent to naive set scoring (15), since the two
di¤er only by a constant (of one). So, joining Remarks 5 and 6, we may view plurality rule
either as the naive set scoring rule or as the discrete-distance-based rule.
24 It ignores the internal structure of judgment sets, hence throws awaymuch information.
25 In trying to re-model an arbitrary set scoring rule F as a distance-based rule, one might be tempted
to dene the distancebetween J and J 0 as d(J; J 0) := J (J) J (J 0). If d turns out to dene a proper
distance function (see fn. 12), then we obtain a distance-based rule Fd , which coincides with the set
scoring rule F . But for many plausible set scorings , d has little in common with a distance function,
violating up to all three axioms, notably symmetry and the triangle inequality.
26This metric derives its name from the fact that it induces the discrete topology on whatever set it is
dened on (such as R instead of J ).
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4.3 Approximating the average voter
Given an ordinary scoring s, we have so far aimed for collective judgments with a high
total score. But this is not the only plausible aim or approach. We now turn to an alto-
gether di¤erent approach. Rather than using s to assign scores only from each individuals
perspective, we now care about how propositions score under the collective judgment set.
Instead of wanting the collective judgments to achieve the highest total score from individ-
uals, we now want them to resemble an average individuals judgmentsin the sense that
the collective judgments should lead (approximately) to the same scores of propositions
as the individual judgments do on average. In short, any proposition ps collective score
should be (approximately) ps average individual score. This approach has its own, rather
di¤erent intuitive appeal. But is it really totally di¤erent? As will turn out, aggregation
rules which follow this approach I call them average-score rulesas opposed to scoring
rulescan be viewed as a particular kind of set scoring rules. This result is in fact a special
case of a powerful precursor result by Zwicker (2008), as Marcus Pivato kindly pointed out
to me.27
Given an ordinary scoring s, we can represent judgment sets in J as vectors in RX , by
identifying each judgment set J in J with its score vector, i.e., the vector in RX whose pth
component is the score of p, sJ(p).28 The score vector corresponding to J 2 J is denoted
Js  (sJ(p))p2X 2 RX . Having represented judgment sets as vectors of numbers, we can
apply standard algebraic and geometric operations, such as adding judgment sets, taking
their average, or measuring their distance where, of course, sums or averages of (score
vectors of) judgment sets in J may be infeasible, i.e., not correspond to any judgment
set in J .
The average-score rule w.r.t. scoring s is dened as the aggregation rule F which for
every prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n chooses the collective judgment set(s) whose score vector
comes closest to the groups average score vector 1n
P
i2N J
s
i in the sense of Euclidean
distance in RX :
F (J1; :::; Jn) = j.s. closest to the average individual j.s. in score vector terms
= argminC2J
Cs   1nX
i2N
Jsi
 .
Viewed geometrically as an operation in RX , the collective score vector is the orthogonal
projection of the average score vector 1n
P
i J
s
i on the set J s  fJs : J 2 J g  RX of
feasible score vectors.29
As an illustration, consider once again reversal scoring for our doctrinal paradox agenda.
Table 6 reports the score vector of each judgment set (including the one not submitted by
any individual), and its distance to the groups average score vector. By minimizing this
distance, the rule delivers a tie between the two conclusion-based outcomes p:q:r and
27Average-score rules are special cases of Zwickers mean proximity rules in his abstract, more gen-
eral aggregation framework. Zwickers Theorem 4.2.1 (more precisely, its proof) reveals that any mean
proximity rule can be given a representation which essentially corresponds to our representation of an
average-score rule in Proposition 6.
28This identication is one-to-one as long as the scoring has the (very plausible) property that sJ (p) >
sJ (:p) whenever p 2 J .
29Formally, F (J1; :::; Jn)s = PROJJ s ( 1n
P
i J
s
i ), where the orthogonal projection of x 2 RX on Y  RX
is dened as PROJY (x) := argminy2Y ky   xk.
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p :p q :q r :r distance to groups average
pqr (indiv. 1) 2 0 2 0 2 0
p
58=3  2:54
p:q:r (indiv. 2) 1 0 0 2 0 2 p37=3  2:03
:pq:r (indiv. 3) 0 2 1 0 0 2 p37=3  2:03
:p:q:r (no indiv.) 0 1 0 1 0 3 7=3  2:33
groups average 1 23 1
2
3
2
3
4
3
Table 6: The average-score rule (w.r.t. reversal scoring) for the doctrinal paradox agenda
and prole
:pq:r. The premise-based outcome pqr looks worse than ever: it is even farther from the
average than the never-submitted outcome :p:q:r.
Now that we have two rival ways of aggregating based on a scoring s namely, the
scoring rule and the average-score rule  the question is whether any connection can be
established. The average-score rule can be construed as a set scoring rule, namely in virtue
of the set scoring given by
J(C) =  kCs   Jsk2 . (17)
Here, C is taken to score high if it is close to J in terms of the squared Euclidean distance
of score vectors.
Proposition 6 For any scoring s, the average-score rule w.r.t. s is the set scoring rule
w.r.t. set scoring (17).
As an application, let s be simple scoring (2). Here, the set scoring (17) is expressible
as an increasing a¢ ne transformation of the set scoring corresponding to simple scoring,
i.e., of the set scoring 0 given by30
0J(C) =
X
p2C
sJ(p) = jC \ J j .
So, the set scoring rule F coincides with the simple scoring rule Fs, and hence with the
Kemeny rule FdK em eny by Proposition 1. Thus, as a corollary of Propositions 1 and 6, the
Kemeny rule can be characterized not just as a scoring rule but also as an average-score
rule, both times using the same scoring:
Corollary 2 The Kemeny rule is the scoring rule and the average-score rule, both times
w.r.t. simple scoring.
4.4 Probability-based set scoring
I close the analysis by taking a brief (skippable) excursion into an important, but di¤er-
ent approach to judgment aggregation: the epistemic or truth-tracking approach. In this
approach, each proposition p 2 X is taken to have an objective, but unknown truth value
(trueor false), and the goal of aggregation is to track the truth, i.e., to generate true
30Since J (C) =  
pjC 4 J j2 =   jC 4 J j =  2 jCnJ j =  2 (jCj   jC \ J j) =   jXj+ 2 jC \ J j.
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collective judgments.31 The truth-tracking perspective has a long history elsewhere in so-
cial choice theory (e.g., Condorcet 1785, Grofman et al. 1983, Austen-Smith and Banks
1996, Dietrich 2006b, Pivato 2011a); but within judgment aggregation theory specically,
rather little work has been done on the epistemic side (e.g., Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006b,
List 2005, Bozbay et al. 2011).
The epistemic approach warrants the use of particular set scoring rules. To show this, I
import standard statistical estimation techniques (such as maximum-likelihood estimation),
following the path taken by other authors in the context of preference aggregation (e.g.,
Young 1995) and other aggregation problems (e.g., Dietrich 2006b, Pivato 2011a). My goal
is to give no more than a brief introduction to what could be done. The results given below
are essentially variants of existing results; see in particular Pivato (2011a).32
For each combination (J1; :::; Jn; T ) 2 J nJ of n+1 judgment sets, let Pr(J1; :::; Jn; T )
> 0 measure the probability that people submit the prole (J1; :::; Jn) and the set of true
propositions is T , where of course
P
(J1;:::;Jn;T )2JnJ Pr(J1; :::; Jn; T ) = 1. From this joint
probability function we can, as usual, derive various marginal and conditional probabili-
ties, such as the probability that the truth is T 2 J , Pr(T ) = P(J1;:::;Jn)2Jn Pr(J1; :::;
Jn; T ), the probability that the prole is (J1; :::; Jn), Pr(J1; :::; Jn) =
P
T2J Pr(J1; :::; Jn;
T ), the conditional probability Pr(T jJ1; :::; Jn) = Pr(J1;:::;Jn;T )Pr(J1;:::;Jn) (called the posterior prob-
ability of T given the dataJ1; :::; Jn), and the conditional probability Pr(J1; :::; JnjT ) =
Pr(J1;:::;Jn;T )
Pr(T ) (called the likelihood of the dataJ1; :::; Jn given T ).
The maximum-likelihood rule is the aggregation rule F : J n  J which for each prole
(J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n denes the collective judgments such that their truth would make the
observed prole (data) maximally likely:
F (J1; :::; Jn) = argmaxT2J Pr(J1; :::; JnjT ).
The maximum-posterior rule is the aggregation rule F : J n  J which for each prole
(J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n denes the collective judgments such that they have maximal posterior
probability of truth conditional on the observed prole (data):
F (J1; :::; Jn) = argmaxT2J Pr(T jJ1; :::; Jn).
Both of these rules correspond to well-established statistical estimation procedures.
Let us now make two standard, but restrictive assumptions on probabilities. We assume
that voters are independentand equally competent(in analogy to the assumptions of
Condorcets classical jury theorem33). Formally, for every T 2 J ,
(IND) the individual judgment sets are independent conditional on T being the true judg-
ment set, i.e., Pr(J1; :::; JnjT ) = Pr(J1jT )   Pr(JnjT ) for all J1; :::; Jn 2 J (inde-
pendence)
(COM) for each J 2 J , each individual has the same probability, denoted Pr(J jT ), of
31The epistemic perspective is usually contrasted with the procedural perspective, which takes the goal of
aggregation to be to generate collective judgments which reect the individualsjudgments in a procedurally
fair way. To illustrate the contrast between the two perspectives, suppose that all individuals hold the
same judgment set J . Then J is clearly the right collective judgment set from the perspective of procedural
fairness. But from an epistemic perspective, all depends on whether peoples unanimous endorsement of J
is su¢ cient evidence for J being true.
32Proposition 7 follows from proofs in Pivato (2011a), and is also related to Dietrich (2006).
33The classical Condorcet jury theorem is essentially concerned with a simple judgment aggregation
problem with a binary agenda X = fp;:pg.
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submitting the judgment set J conditional on T being the true judgment set (equal
competence).
Condition (COM) in particular implies that individuals have the same (conditional)
probability of holding the true judgment set; but nothing is assumed about the size of
this probability of getting it right. The just-dened aggregation rules turn out to be set
scoring rules in virtue of dening the score of T 2 J given J 2 J by, respectively,
J(T ) = log Pr(J jT ) (18)
J(T ) = log Pr(J jT ) + 1
n
log Pr(T ). (19)
Proposition 7 If voters are independent (IND) and equally competent (COM), then
 the maximum-likelihood rule is the set scoring rule w.r.t. set scoring (18),
 the maximum-posterior rule is the set scoring w.r.t. set scoring (19).
5 Concluding remarks
I hope to have convinced the reader that scoring rules, and more generally set scoring rules,
form interesting positive solutions to the judgment aggregation problem. They for instance
allow us to generalize Borda aggregation to judgment aggregation (the simplest method
being to use reversal scoring). Figure 1 summarizes where we stand by depicting di¤erent
classes of rules (scoring rules, set scoring rules, and distance-based rules) and positioning
several concrete rules (such as Kemeny rule). While the positions of most rules in Figure 1
arbitrary rules
distance-base
rules
scoring
rules
set scoring
rules
the Condorcet-
admissibility rule
the “truth-tracking”
rules of Section 4.4
Kemeny rule
generalized Borda
rule using, e.g.,
reversal scoring
non-anonymous rules
plurality rule
propositionwise
scoring rules
entailment-based
scoring rules (Section 3.4)
average-score
rules
the premise- and
conclusion-based
rules (and other
priority rules)
Figure 1: A map of judgment aggregation possibilities
have been established above or follow easily, a few positions are of the order of conjectures.
This is so for the placement of our Borda generalization outside the class of distance-based
rules.34
34For technical correctness, I also note two details about how to read Figure 1. First, for trivial agendas,
such as a single-issue agenda X = fp;:pg, several rules of course become equivalent, and distinctions
drawn in Figure 1 disappear. More precisely, by positioning a rule outside a class of rules (e.g., by
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Though several old and new aggregation rules are scoring rules (or at least set scoring
rules), there are important counterexamples. One counterexample is the mentioned rule
introduced by Nehring et al. (2011) (the so-called Condorcet-admissibility rule, which
generates rational judgment set(s) that approximatethe majority judgment set). Other
counterexamples are non-anonymous rules (such as rules prioritizing experts), and rules
that return boundedly rational collective judgments (such as rules returning incomplete but
still consistent and deductively closed judgments). The last two kinds of counterexamples
suggest two generalizations of the notion of a scoring rule. Firstly, scoring might be allowed
to depend on the individual; this leads to non-anonymous scoring rules. Secondly, the
search for a collective judgment set with maximal total score might be done within a larger
set than the set J of fully rational judgment sets (such as the set of consistent but possibly
incomplete judgment sets); this leads to boundedly rational scoring rules. The same
generalizations could of course be made for set scoring rules. Much work is ahead of us.
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7 Appendix: proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The Kemeny-distance between J;C 2 J can be written as
dKemeny(J;C) =
1
2
jJ 4 Cj = 1
2
(jXj   (jJ \ Cj+ J \ C)).
Now, since J and C each contains exactly one member of each pair fp;:pg  X, we have
p 2 J\C , :p 2 J\C, and so, jJ \ Cj = J \ C. Hence, dKemeny(J;C) = 12 jXj jJ \ Cj.
So, for each prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n, minimizing
P
i2N dKemeny(Ji; C) is equivalent to
maximizing
P
i2N jJi \ Cj. Hence, rewriting each jJi \ Cj as
P
p2C sJi(p) where s is simple
scoring (2), it follows that FdK em eny (J1; :::; Jn) = Fs(J1; :::; Jn). 
Before proving Proposition 2, I start with a lemma.
Lemma 1 Consider the preference agenda (for any nite set of alternatives A), any clas-
sical scoring SCO, and the scoring s given by (4). For all distinct x; y 2 A and all J 2 J ,
SCOJ(x)  SCOJ(y) = sJ(xPy)  sJ(yPx): (20)
Proof. This follows easily from (4). 
Two elements of a set of alternatives A are called neighbours w.r.t. a strict linear order
 over A if they di¤er and no alternative in A is ranked strictly between them. In the
case of the preference agenda (for a set of alternatives A), the strict linear order over A
corresponding to any J 2 J is denoted J .
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider the preference agenda X for a set of alternatives A of
nite size k, and let SCO be any classical scoring. I show that FSCO = Fs for each scoring
s satisfying (20), and hence for the scoring (4) (since it satises (20) by Lemma 1) and the
scoring (3) (since a half times it satises (20)).
Consider any scoring s satisfying (20). Fix a prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n; I show Fs(J1; :::;
Jn) = FSCO(J1; :::; Jn). The proof is in three claims.
Claim 1. For all a; b 2 A and C;C 0 2 J , if CnC 0 = faPbg, thenX
i2N
SCOJi(a) 
X
i2N
SCOJi(b) =
X
i2N;p2C
sJi(p) 
X
i2N;p2C0
sJi(p).
Consider a; b 2 A and C;C 0 2 J such that CnC 0 = faPbg. For each individual i 2 N ,
we by (20) have
SCOJi(a)  SCOJi(b) = sJi(aPb)  sJi(bPa);
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which, noting that C 0 = (CnfaPbg) [ fbPag, implies that
SCOJi(a)  SCOJi(b) =
X
p2C
sJi(p) 
X
p2C0
sJi(p).
Summing over all individuals, the claim follows, q.e.d.
Claim 2. Fs(J1; :::; Jn)  FSCO(J1; :::; Jn).
Consider any C 2 Fs(J1; :::; Jn). We have to show that C 2 FSCO(J1; :::; Jn), i.e., that
for all distinct x; y 2 A,X
i2N
SCOJi(x) >
X
i2N
SCOJi(y)) xPy 2 C,
or equivalently,
yPx 2 C )
X
i2N
SCOJi(y) 
X
i2N
SCOJi(x).
Said in yet another way, we have to show thatX
i2N
SCOJi(xk) 
X
i2N
SCOJi(xk 1)     
X
i2N
SCOJi(x1),
where I have labelled the alternatives x1; x2; :::; xk such that xk C xk 1 C    C x1.
Consider any t 2 f1; :::; k 1g, and write a for xt+1 and b for xt. Let C 0 be the judgment set
arising from C by replacing aPb with its negation bPa. Now C 0 2 J ; this is because a and
b are neighbours w.r.t. C , which guarantees that C 0 corresponds to a strict linear order
(namely to the same one as for C except that b now ranks above a). Since C 2 Fs(J1; :::; Jn),
C has maximal sum-total score within J ; in particular,X
i2N;p2C
sJi(p) 
X
i2N;p2C0
sJi(p),
which by Claim 1 implies the desired inequality,X
i2N
SCOJi(a) 
X
i2N
SCOJi(b), q.e.d.
Claim 3. FSCO(J1; :::; Jn)  Fs(J1; :::; Jn).
Consider any C 2 FSCO(J1; :::; Jn). To show that C 2 Fs(J1; :::; Jn); we consider an
arbitrary C 0 2 J nfCg and have to show that C has an at least as high sum-total score as
C 0: X
i2N;p2C
sJi(p) 
X
i2N;p2C0
sJi(p). (21)
To prove this, we rst transform C gradually into C 0 in m  jC 0nCj steps, where each
step consists in a single judgment reversal, i.e., in the replacement of a single proposition
xPy (2 CnC 0) by its negation yPx (2 C 0nC). This denes a sequence of judgment sets
C0; :::; Cm, where C0 = C and Cm = C 0, and where for each step t 2 f1; :::;mg there is
a proposition xtPyt such that Ct = (Ct 1nfxtPytg) [ fytPxtg. Note that fxtPyt : t =
1; :::;mg = CnC 0. By a standard relation-theoretic argument, we may assume that in each
step t the judgment reversal consists in switching the relative order of two neighbouring
alternatives; i.e., xt; yt are neighbours w.r.t. the old and new relations Ct 1 and Ct .
This guarantees that each step t generates a set Ct such that Ct is still a strict linear
order, i.e., such that Ct 2 J .
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Now for each step t, by Claim 1 we haveX
i2N
SCOJi(xt) 
X
i2N
SCOJi(yt) =
X
i2N;p2Ct 1
sJi(p) 
X
i2N;p2Ct
sJi(p),
and also, since ytPxt 62 C and C 2 FSCO(J1; :::; Jn), we haveX
i2N
SCOJi(yt) 
X
i2N
SCOJi(xt);
it follows that X
i2N;p2Ct 1
sJi(p) 
X
i2N;p2Ct
sJi(p)  0.
Summing this inequality over all steps t 2 f1; :::;mg, we obtainX
i2N;p2C0
sJi(p) 
X
i2N;p2Cm
sJi(p)  0,
which is equivalent to the desired inequality (21) since C0 = C and Cm = C 0. 
Proof of Remark 2. Let s0 be dened from reversal scoring s in the specied way.
Claim 1. s0 and s are equivalent.
Consider any prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n. I show for all C;D 2 J thatX
i2N;p2C
sJi(p) 
X
i2N;p2D
sJi(p),
X
i2N;p2C
s0Ji(p) 
X
i2N;p2D
s0Ji(p).
Consider any C;D 2 J . I prove that   0, 0  0, where
 
X
i2N;p2C
sJi(p) 
X
i2N;p2D
sJi(p)  0,
0 
X
i2N;p2C
s0Ji(p) 
X
i2N;p2D
s0Ji(p)  0.
We have
 =
X
i2N
8<:X
p2C
sJi(p) 
X
p2D
sJi(p)
9=; =X
i2N
8<: X
p2CnD
sJi(p) 
X
p2DnC
sJi(p)
9=; .
So, noting that DnC = f:p : p 2 CnDg, we obtain
 =
X
i2N
X
p2CnD
(sJi(p)  sJi(:p)).
By an analogous reasoning,
0 =
X
i2N
X
p2CnD
(s0Ji(p)  s0Ji(:p)).
Hence, using the denition of s0,
0 =
X
i2N
X
p2CnD
([sJi(p)  sJi(:p)]  [sJi(:p)  sJi(p)])
= 2
X
i2N
X
p2CnD
(sJi(p)  sJi(:p))
= 2.
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So,   0, 0  0, q.e.d.
Claim 2. If X is the preference agenda, SCO is classical Borda scoring, J 2 J , and
xPy 2 X, then s0J(xPy) = SCOJ(x)  SCOJ(y).
Let X, SCO, J and xPy be as specied. If xPy 2 J , then
s0(xPy) = s(xPy) by denition of s0
= SCOJ(x)  SCOJ(y) by Remark 1, as xPy 2 J .
If xPy 62 J , i.e., yPx 2 J , then
s0(xPy) =  s(yPx) by denition of s0
=  (SCOJ(y)  SCOJ(x)) by Remark 1, as yPx 2 J
= SCOJ(x)  SCOJ(y). 
Proof of Proposition 4. Let X be the preference agenda for some set of alternatives
A of size k < 1. Let srev , sdis and sirr be reversal, disjoint-entailment, and irreducible-
entailment scoring, respectively. Consider any J 2 J , denote the corresponding strict linear
order by , let x1; :::; xk be the alternatives in the order given by xk  xk 1      x1,
and consider any p 2 X, say p = xiPxi0 2 X.
Claim 1. srevJ (p) = s
irr
J (p).
By the argument given in footnote 16, srevJ (p)  sdisJ (p). I now show that sdisJ (p) 
srevJ (p). This inequality is trivial if p 62 J , since then srevJ (p) = 0 (as :p 2 J). Now suppose
p 2 J . By Remark 1, srevJ (p) = i   i0. So we need to show that sdisJ (p)  i   i0. Consider
the i  i0 judgment subsets S1; :::; Si i0  J dened as follows: for each j 2 f1; :::; i  i0g,
Sj  fxiPxi j ; xi jPxi0g  J ,
where Si i0 is interpreted as the set fxiPxi0g (rather than the set fxiPxi0 ; xi0Pxi0g, which
is not well-dened since xi0Pxi0 is not a proposition in X). Since these judgment subsets
are pairwise disjoint and each of them entails p (= xiPxi0), we have sdisJ (p)  i  i0, q.e.d.
Claim 2. srevJ (p) = s
irr
J (p).
If p 62 J , then srevJ (p) = sirrJ (p) since srevJ (p) = 0 (as :p 2 J) and sirrJ (p) = 0 (as J
does not entail p). Now suppose p 2 J . Then, as already mentioned, srevJ (p) = i   i0
by Remark 1. So we need to show that sirrJ (p) = i   i0. As one may show, each of
the just-dened sets S1; :::; Si i0 irreducibly entails p (= xiPxi0). So it remains to show
that no other judgment subset irreducibly entails p. Suppose S  J irreducibly entails
p. I have to show that S 2 fS1; :::; Si i0g. As is easily checked, the set S [ f:pg
(= S [ fxi0Pxig) is minimal inconsistent. Hence, this set is cyclic, i.e., of the form
S [ f:pg = fy1Py2; y2Py3; :::; ym 1Pym; ymPy1g for some m  2 and some distinct al-
ternatives y1; :::; ym 2 A (see Dietrich and List 2010). Without loss of generality, assume
y1 = xi and ym = xi0 , so that ymPy1 = xi0Pxi and
S = fy1Py2; y2Py3; :::; ym 1Pymg:
If m = 2, then S = fy1Py2g = fxiPxi0g, which equals Si i0 , and we are done. If m = 3,
then S = fy1Py2; y2Py3g = fxiPy2; y2Pxi0g. Since S is by assumption included in J ,
it follows that J ranks y2 between xi and xi0 . So there is a j 2 f1; :::; i   i0   1g such
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that y2 = xi j . Hence, S is the set fxiPxi j ; xi jPxi0g = Sj , and we are done again.
Finally, m cannot exceed 3, since otherwise the set S (= fxiPy2; y2Py3; :::; ym 1Pxi0g)
would entail p (= xiPxi0) non-irreducibly, since the set arising from S by replacing xiPy2
and y2Py3 with their implication xiPy3 still entails p. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Consider any threshold family (mp)p2X (2 f1; :::; ngX), and de-
ne scoring s by (12). Consider a prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n for which C  F(mp)p2X (J1; :::;
Jn) belongs to J . We have to show that Fs(J1; :::; Jn) = C. For each proposition p 2 X,
writing the number of individuals accepting p as np  jfi : p 2 Jigj, the sum-total score of
p is given by X
i2N
sJi(p) =
X
i2N :p2Ji
(n+ 1 mp) +
X
i2N :p62Ji
( mp)
= np(n+ 1 mp) + (n  np)( mp)
= nnp + np   nmp.
= n(np  mp) + np;
and so, X
i2N
sJi(p)

> 0 if np  mp, i.e., if p 2 C
< 0 if np < mp, i.e., if p 62 C. (22)
Now we have fCg = argmaxC2J
P
p2C;i2N sJi(p), because for each C 2 J nfCg,X
p2C;i2N
sJi(p) 
X
p2C;i2N
sJi(p) =
X
p2CnC
X
i2N
sJi(p)| {z }
>0 by (22)
 
X
p2CnC
X
i2N
sJi(p)| {z }
<0 by (22)
> 0.
So, Fs(J1; :::; Jn) = fCg  C. 
Proof of Remark 4. Consider this X and P , let n be odd, and let s be scoring (14). I
write pr for premise and co for conclusion. Whenever I consider a prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n,
I write Nt := fi : t 2 Jig for all t 2 X, and I writeMAJ , PRE , CON and SCO for the
outcome of majority rule, premise-based rule, conclusion-based rule, and the scoring rule
w.r.t. (14), respectively. Note that for all (J1; :::; Jn) 2 J n the sum-total score of a
C = fp0; q0; r0g 2 J (where p0 2 fp;:pg, q0 2 fq;:qg and r0 2 fr;:rg) is given byX
i2N;t2C
sJi(t) = (jNp0 j+ jNq0 j)pr + jNrjco: (23)
Claim 1. [PRE = SCO for all proles in Jn] if and only if pr > (n  2)co.
First, assume PRE = SCO for all prole in Jn. As one may check, there is a prole
such that jNpj = jNqj = n+12 and jNrj = 1. For this prole, PRE = fp; q; rg. So,
SCO = fp; q; rg. Hence, the sum-total score of fp; q; rg exceeds that of f:p; q;:rg. By
(23), these two sum-total scores can be written, respectively, asX
i2N;t2fp;q;rg
sJi(t) =
n+ 1
2
pr +
n+ 1
2
pr + co = (n+ 1)pr + co
X
i2N;t2f:p;q;:rg
sJi(t) =
n  1
2
pr +
n+ 1
2
pr + (n  1)co = npr + (n  1)co.
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Hence,
(n+ 1)pr + co > npr + (n  1)co,
or equivalently, pr > (n  2)co.
Conversely, assume pr > (n   2)co. Consider any prole. We have to show that
PRE = SCO.
Case 1 : MAJ 2 J . Check that it follows that PRE =MAJ , and also that SCO =
MAJ . So, PRE = SCO.
Case 2 : MAJ 62 J . Check that it follows that MAJ = fp; q;:rg. Hence PRE =
fp; q; rg. We thus have to show that SCO = fp; q; rg, i.e., that
1 
X
i2N;t2fp;q;rg
sJi(t) 
X
i2N;t2f:p;q;:rg
sJi(t) > 0
2 
X
i2N;t2fp;q;rg
sJi(t) 
X
i2N;t2fp;:q;:rg
sJi(t) > 0
3 
X
i2N;t2fp;q;rg
sJi(t) 
X
i2N;t2f:p;:q;:rg
sJi(t) > 0.
By (23),
1 = (jNpj   jN:pj)pr + (jNrj   jN:rj)co = (2 jNpj   n)pr + (2 jNrj   n)co: (24)
In this, as p 2 MAJ we have jNpj  (n+ 1)=2; and further, as p; q 2 MAJ the sets Np
and Nq each contain a majority, so that Np \Nq 6= ?, which (since Np \Nq  Nr) implies
jNrj  1. Using these lower bounds for jNpj and jNrj, we obtain
1  ((n+ 1)  n)pr + (2  n)co = pr + (2  n)co > 0.
The proof that 2 > 0 is analogous. Finally, by (23),
3 = (jNpj   jN:pj)pr + (jNqj   jN:qj)pr + (jNrj   jN:rj)co.
Since jNqj > jN:qj (since q 2 MAJ), it follows using (24) that 3 > 2, and hence, that
3 > 0, q.e.d.
Claim 2. [CON = SCO for all proles in Jn] if and only if co > pr = 0.
Unlike in the proof of the Claim, there may be ties, and so we treat CON and SCO
as subsets of J, not elements. First, if co > pr = 0, then it is easy to show that
CON = SCO for each prole. Conversely, suppose it is not the case that co > pr =
0. Then either co = pr = 0 or pr > 0. In the rst case, clearly CON 6= SCO
for some proles, since SCO is always J. In the second case, again CON 6= SCO for
some proles: for instance, if each individual submits :pq:r then SCO = f:pq:rg while
CON = f:pq:r; p:q:r;:p:q:rg. 
Proof of Proposition 6. It will sometimes be convenient to write a vectorD = (D1; :::; Dn)
2 Rn as hDii. The mean and variance of this vector D are denoted and dened by, respec-
tively,
D  1
n
X
i2N
Di and V ar(D)  1
n
X
i2N
(Di  D)2.
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In this notation, the average square deviation of a constant c 2 R from the components in
D is h(c Di)2i and satises
h(c Di)2i = (c D)2 + V ar(D); (25)
by the following argument borrowed from statistics:
h(c Di)2i =


(c D +D  Di)2

=


(c D)2 + 2(c D)(D  Di) + (D  Di)2

= (c D)2 + 2(c D)
D  Di+ 
(D  Di)2
= (c D)2 + 0 + V ar(D).
Now consider any scoring s and let the set scoring  be dened by (17). Consider any
prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2Jn and any C 2 J . Under , the sum-total score of C can be written
as X
i2N
Ji(C) =  
X
i2N
kCs   Jsi k2
=  
X
i2N
X
p2X
(Csp   Jsip)2
=  n
X
p2X
1
n
X
i2N
(Csp   Jsip)2.
Here, the inner expression can be re-expressed as
1
n
X
i2N
(Csp   Jsip)2 =


(Csp   Jsip)2

= (Csp  


Jsip

)2 + V ar(


Jsip

),
where the last equality applies (25) with c = Csp and D =


Jsip

. It follows thatX
i2N
Ji(C) =  n
X
p2X
n
(Csp  


Jsip

)2 + V ar(


Jsip

)
o
=  n
X
p2X
(Csp  


Jsip

)2 + d (for some d independent of C)
=  n
C   hJsi i2 + d.
Maximizing this expression w.r.t. C 2 J is equivalent to minimizing its strictly decreasing
transformation
C   hJsi i w.r.t. C 2 J . So, the set scoring rule w.r.t.  delivers the
same collective judgment set(s) C as the average-score rule w.r.t. s. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Assume (IND) and (COM) and consider a prole (J1; :::; Jn) 2
J n.
Firstly, using (IND), the likelihood of the prole given C 2 J can be written as
Pr(J1; :::; JnjT ) =
Y
i2N
Pr(JijT ).
Maximizing this expression (w.r.t. T 2 J ) is equivalent to maximizing its logarithm,X
i2N
log Pr(JijT ),
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which is precisely the sum-total score of T under set scoring (18).
Secondly, writing  for the proles probability Pr(J1; :::; Jn), the posterior probability
of T 2 J given the prole can be written as
Pr(T jJ1; :::; Jn) = 1

Pr(T ) Pr(J1; :::; JnjT ) = 1

Pr(T )
Y
i2N
Pr(JijT ).
Maximizing this expression (w.r.t. T 2 J ) is equivalent to maximizing its logarithm, and
hence, to maximizing
log Pr(T ) +
X
i2N
log Pr(JijT ) =
X
i2N
(log Pr(JijT ) + 1
n
log Pr(T )),
which is the sum-total score of T under set scoring (19). 
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